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The Radical Uncertainty of Free 
Exercise Principles: A Comment on Fulton v. City of Philadelphia 
 
Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle* 
 
 This paper addresses the decision in Fulton v. City of Philadelphia (June 17, 2021), in 
which a unanimous Supreme Court upheld a claim under the First Amendment’s Free Exercise 
Clause by Catholic Social Services (CSS) against the City. CSS had objected on religious grounds 
to screening same sex married couples as prospective foster parents, despite a provision in its 
contract with the City that prohibited such discrimination. Every Justice voted to uphold the Free 
Exercise Claim. Only three Justices, however, supported the overruling of the Court’s highly 
controversial decision in Employment Division v. Smith (1990), which insulated religion-
neutral, generally applicable policies from free exercise exemption claims. Three Justices expressed 
reservations about that question, and three others remained entirely silent about it. Smith 
endures. 
 
 Part I of the paper focuses on the veneer of unanimity in Fulton. Unlike in Hosanna-
Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC (2012), in which the Court’s 
unanimity reflected a commitment to deep and abiding church-state principles, the unanimity in 
Fulton is a pretext, and a product of radical uncertainty about the future of free exercise 
principles.  
 
 Part II of the paper analyzes the thickness of the threads by which the Smith decision 
hangs. Part II.A. discusses the overwhelming hostility to Smith—not shared by us—among 
concerned citizens, elected officials, academics, and many judges over the past thirty years. Part 
II.B. criticizes Justice Samuel Alito’s lengthy opinion, calling for Smith to be overruled. He is 
wrong in his effort to make the law from 1963-1990 the centerpiece of free exercise jurisprudence. 
His view of the text and history of the Free Exercise Clause is also wrong, because he assumes 
that the constitutional concept of free exercise of religion covered all religiously motivated action. 
As his sources show, “free exercise of religion” in the relevant historical period encompassed only 
modes of worship and religious belief. Part II. C. analyzes the consequences of Justice Alito’s 
overbroad conception of free exercise, and explains why these consequences drove the Smith 
	
* The authors are both affiliated with the George Washington University. Ira C. Lupu is the F. 
Elwood & Eleanor Davis Professor Emeritus of Law; Robert W. Tuttle is the David R. and Sherry 
Kirschner Berz Research Professor of Law and Religion. The authors filed an amicus brief in 
Fulton, along with two other religion-law scholars, Brief of Professors Ira C. Lupu, Frederick 
Mark Gedicks, William P. Marshall, and Robert W. Tuttle as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Respondents, Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 141 S. Ct. 1868 (2021) (No. 19-123), available 
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decision, as well as the reluctance of Justices Amy Coney Barrett, Brett Kavanaugh, and Stephen 
Breyer to overturn Smith. Part II.D. analyzes the Court’s recent attempts to narrow the concept 
of general applicability in the COVID-19 cases about restrictions on gathering for worship, and 
in Fulton itself. These moves, taken to their logical end, effectively undo Smith. The history of 
Free Exercise Clause adjudication, however, suggests that neither the Supreme Court nor the 





 As the Supreme Court’s 2020-21 Term moved into mid-June, many lawyers, 
scholars, and concerned citizens waited anxiously for the Court’s disposition of Fulton v. 
City of Philadelphia.1 The case involved a conflict between Catholic Social Services (CSS) 
of Philadelphia and the City, over whether CSS had a right under the Free Exercise 
Clause to refuse to evaluate same sex married couples for eligibility to be foster parents. 
The contract between CSS and the City included requirements of non-discrimination 
with respect to sexual orientation of prospective foster parents. CSS objected to this 
requirement, claiming that the rule burdened its organizational religious beliefs that 
marriage is reserved for unions of one man and one woman.  
 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit ruled in favor of the City.2 A 
central premise of its ruling was the ongoing validity of the Supreme Court’s 1990 
decision in Employment Division v. Smith,3 which held that the Free Exercise Clause does 
not confer rights to religion-based exemptions from laws that are religion-neutral and 
generally applicable to the relevant parties. The Third Circuit agreed with the City that 
Smith precluded a constitutional right of exemption from its prohibition on 
discrimination against same sex married couples, because all social welfare agencies 
(religious or not) in the foster care system had to abide by that prohibition.  
 
In its certiorari petition,4 Catholic Social Services explicitly urged the Court to 
consider whether Smith should be overruled, and the Court included that question in the 
grant of review. CSS asserted, as many lawyers had for years, that Smith had 
unconstitutionally left religious liberty at the mercy of legislators and government 
administrators. Courts, claimed CSS, should play a larger role.  
	
1 Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 141 S. Ct. 1868 (2021) (No. 19-123) [hereinafter Fulton], available 
at https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/20pdf/19-123_g3bi.pdf 
https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/20pdf/19-123_g3bi.pdf. 
2 Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 922 F.3d 140 (3d Cir. 2019). 
3 Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) [hereinafter Smith]. 






The Supreme Court heard argument in Fulton on the day after Election Day, 
2020, just a few days after Justice Amy Coney Barrett took the oath of her new office. 
Seven and half months later, the Supreme Court surprised every Court watcher with a 
unanimous decision in favor of CSS. The Court was not unanimous, however, on the 
issues involving the content of free exercise principles. Chief Justice John Roberts wrote 
the Court opinion for six justices, resting its holding on the narrow and questionable 
ground that the City’s non-discrimination policies were not “generally applicable,” and 
therefore were outside of the protective ambit of Smith.5 That conclusion led the Court to 
apply more rigorous scrutiny to the City’s treatment of CSS, and the Court determined, 
with almost no analysis, that the exclusion violated CSS’s free exercise rights.6 
 
Over the course of two separate opinions, joined by all of them, three justices—
Justices Samuel Alito, Neil Gorsuch, and Clarence Thomas—concurred in the judgment 
only. The Gorsuch opinion accused the majority of relying on disingenuous arguments  
to avoid the question of whether Smith should be overruled.7 And Justice Alito, in a 
sweeping seventy-seven pages, argued emphatically that Smith should indeed be 
overruled.8  
 
Justice Roberts’s Court opinion offered no answer to Justice Alito’s extended 
attack on Smith. The only answer from anyone in the Court’s majority appeared in a 
very brief, concurring opinion by Justice Amy Coney Barrett.9 It was not a surprise that 
the appointment of Justice Barrett proved auspicious. Her predecessor, Justice Ruth 
Bader Ginsburg, had supported the decision in Smith throughout her tenure on the 
Court.10 Justice Barrett indeed diverged from the Ginsburg line, but not in the ways her 
supporters had hoped, or her opponents had feared. 
  
Justice Barrett, joined by Justices Kavanaugh, leaned toward agreement that the 
text and structure of the Free Exercise Clause did not support Smith. But her opinion 
expressed doubt concerning Justice Alito’s view of the history relevant to the Free 
Exercise Clause,11 and identified a set of crucial questions, pointedly not answered by 
Justice Alito, about the uncertainty that would follow from overruling Smith.12 Justice 
	
5 Fulton, 141 S. Ct. at 1877. 
6 Id. at 1881-1882 
7 Id. at 1926 (Gorusch, J., joined by Thomas, J. and Alito, J., concurring in the judgment only). 
8 Id. at 1883 (Alito, J., joined by Thomas, J. and Gorsuch, J., concurring in the judgment only). 
9 Id. at 1882 (Barrett, J., concurring, joined by Kavanaugh, J. and in all but the first paragraph by 
Breyer, J.) 
10 See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Archbishop Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 




Barrett saw no reason to leap into the free exercise thicket in a case where all nine 
justices agreed that CSS should prevail.  
 
 Fulton invites consideration of virtually all the questions and nuances of free 
exercise law that have occupied judges, lawyers, and scholars for the past three decades. 
In the space we have here, we want to highlight several features of Fulton.  
 
As widely noted, the Court was unanimous on the outcome in favor of CSS. 
Unanimity is rare in Religion Clause adjudication, and its causes and consequences 
deserve attention. Part I of this Comment compares the last surprisingly unanimous 
Religion Clause decision, Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC,13 
with the decision in Fulton. As we will explain, unanimity in Hosanna-Tabor was wide, 
deep, and rooted in longstanding Religion Clause principles. In contrast, unanimity in 
Fulton was shallow, perhaps even pretextual, a mask incapable of hiding deep 
disagreements. 
 
 Part II explores the threads by which Smith’s future hangs. Part II.A. describes 
the hostile reaction to Smith over the past thirty years in legal, academic, religious, and 
political circles. This hostility manifested itself in the briefing in Fulton, and appeared in 
full flower in Justice Alito’s concurring opinion.  
 
Part II.B. explains why Justice Alito’s view of the text and history of the Free 
Exercise Clause is deeply wrong. The framers of the First Amendment designed the 
Clause to protect religious communities from government interference with their 
worship practices. Justice Alito’s far broader conception of the Clause as protective of all 
religiously motivated practices is at the root of his mistakes.  
 
Part II.C. explores the consequences of his mistaken view. If the Clause 
strenuously protects all religiously motivated practices, and if believers get to self-
identify which of their practices are religiously motivated, the Free Exercise Clause 
becomes a ticket to override virtually all government policy. Identifying Justice Alito’s 
mistakes thus sheds light on why Smith was correct, and why so many people have 
trouble seeing that. Our critique of Justice Alito also helps explain why Justices Barrett 
and Kavanaugh drew back from embracing his view. Justices Barrett and Kavanaugh 
saw, perhaps through a glass darkly, that Justices Alito, Gorsuch, and Thomas had no 
answer to the questions that inevitably arise from such a broad constitutional conception 
of religious exercise. In that process of perception lies the salutary story of why the 
Court lacked five votes to overrule Smith, and the explanation of why the current law in 
some form remains likely to endure.  
 
	
13 Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171 (2012). 
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 Part II.D., focusing on the Court’s COVID-19 cases and Fulton itself, explores the 
apparent contraction of what qualifies as a law of general applicability. The questions 
here are subtle, and deserve attention, because these narrowing moves threaten to 
undermine the framework on which Employment Division v. Smith has been built. 
 
I. Free Exercise of Religion and the Mysteries of Unanimity 
 
Nine years ago, in Hosanna-Tabor, a fully unanimous Court embraced the 
“ministerial exception” to laws governing the employment relation. The case involved a 
fourth-grade teacher, Cheryl Perich, who had a ministerial title and some responsibilities 
for teaching the faith. After being dismissed, Ms. Perich filed a lawsuit against her 
employer, alleging retaliation for seeking civil redress for discrimination based on 
disability. The context most assuredly invited a liberal critique of any legal theory that 
cut off civil-rights claims by employees. 
 
Nevertheless, all nine justices agreed that Ms. Perich served a ministerial function 
within the school, and that both First Amendment Religion Clauses barred the claim 
against her employer. The decision rested on a longstanding principle, dating to the 
nineteenth century in American law,14 that courts are constitutionally incompetent to 
decide exclusively ecclesiastical questions. The fitness of a class of persons, or of a 
particular person, for ministry is such a question. Accordingly, once a court determines 
that an employee functions as a minister—that is, has substantial responsibility for 
teaching or communicating the faith—any inquiry into the wrongfulness of her 
dismissal must end. The matter is for the religious employer alone.  
 
Every justice agreed to this basic account, and to the application of the relevant 
principles to Cheryl Perich.15 Moreover, and crucial to our account of Hosanna-Tabor, the 
ministerial exception invites no balancing of interests.16 It operates just like other 
Establishment Clause limitations, such as the prohibition on public-school-sponsored 
prayer.17 No state interest, however important or precisely served, can overcome 
Establishment Clause limitations.  
 
The refusal to balance interests in ministerial exception cases is made explicit in 
Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion for the Court.18 This move is highly distinctive in 
Religion Clause adjudication. In Free Exercise cases, before and after Smith, the 
	
14 Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871). 
15 We explore in depth what led to unanimity in Hosanna-Tabor in Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, 
The Mystery of Unanimity in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC, 20 
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1265 (2017) [hereinafter Lupu & Tuttle, The Mystery]. 
16 Id. at 1276-77. 
17 See, e.g., Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962). 
18 Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 196. 
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government’s interest in imposing a restriction is always of relevance. And one can 
imagine that an interest-balancing approach would matter significantly in a ministerial 
exception case. In the case of Cheryl Perich, in particular, her responsibility for teaching 
the faith was relatively slight. She did not preach at large worship gatherings. The 
government’s side of the ledger, had it counted, would register the strong interest in 
barring retaliation against employees who go to public agencies or courts with 
discrimination claims. Because some employees are in positions for which the 
ministerial character is uncertain, a ruling that they can be the subject of retaliatory 
firings deters their complaints and limits rightful enforcement of the law. 
 
Hosanna-Tabor, therefore, involves unanimity at a level that is wide, deep, and 
heavily pedigreed. Its approach covers the adjudication of all exclusively ecclesiastical 
questions, whether they involve personnel, property,19 or internal structures of church 
governance.20 Courts must abstain from adjudicating these disputes, and government 
interests, however strong, play no part in their resolution.21  
 
This is not a doctrine of free exercise-based church autonomy, in which interests are 
uneasily balanced.22 It has a wider base than that—both Religion Clauses. It also has a 
narrower ambit—exclusively ecclesiastical questions, rather than the vaguer notion of 
internal church affairs.23 And its methodology is categorical. Courts are wholly 
incompetent to decide those questions.  
 
	
19 See, e.g., Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393 
U.S. 440 (1969). 
20 See, e.g., Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976). 
21 The Court’s decision in Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979), offers an occasional counterweight to 
the broad idea of “ecclesiastical abstention” reflected in the ministerial exception. That decision 
permits courts to decide cases that may be resolved solely by “secular law.” In the context of 
employment disputes, the Supreme Court and lower courts have given little room for that 
alternative method of resolving cases. See Our Lady of Guadalupe School v. Morrissey-Berru, 140 
S. Ct. 2049 (2020). One important exception to that trend are certain claims of a hostile work 
environment based on sex. For discussion, see Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, #MeToo Meets the 
Ministerial Exception: Sexual Harassment Claims by Clergy and the First Amendment’s Religion Clause, 
25 WM. & MARY J. OF GENDER, RACE, AND SOC. JUST. 249 (2019). See also Rachel Casper, When 
Harassment at Work is Harassment at Church: Hostile Work Environment and the Ministerial 
Exception, forthcoming Univ. of Pa. J. Law & Soc. Change, available here: 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3887812. 
22 For discussion and critique of a variety of theories of church autonomy, see Lupu & Tuttle, The 
Mystery, at 1296-1299, and sources cites therein.  
23 In Our Lady of Guadalupe School v. Morrissey-Berru, 140 S. Ct. 2049 (2020), the Court divided 7-2 
on application of the ministerial exception to particular elementary school teachers, but no justice 
rejected the basic principle on which the exception rests.  
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Contrast the situation in Fulton, which offers only the veneer of unanimity. First, the 
unanimity is in the result, not the reasoning. Six justices, represented in Chief Justice 
Roberts’s opinion for the Court, asserted that the relevant norms of non-discrimination 
were not generally applicable within the meaning of Smith. This conclusion rested on the 
spectacularly specious ground that the Commissioner of Social Services had discretion, 
which his office had never exercised, to make exceptions to the City contract’s 
requirements of non-discrimination in screening prospective foster parents. Even though 
the non-discrimination norms in fact had been uniformly and consistently applied to 
every social welfare agency, religious or secular, the majority hunted for a way to push 
the case out of the ambit of Smith.  
 
Once that was done, the Court still had to determine whether the City’s policy could 
survive the strict judicial review that followed. In a remarkably superficial passage, the 
majority reasoned that the very possibility of exceptions meant that the government’s 
interest in denying exceptions could not be sufficiently important.24 As anyone can see, it 
is utterly unpersuasive to diminish the City’s interest in denying exceptions to non-
discrimination norms by reference to the never-exercised power to grant such 
exceptions. Something explains this thin and weak reasoning, but none of the justices 
who joined the Court opinion makes the attempt. 
 
The three justices who did not join the Court’s opinion had a ready explanation for 
the Court’s maneuvers. Justice Gorsuch, joined by Justices Alito and Thomas, attacked 
the majority’s reasoning on the general applicability of Philadelphia’s non-
discrimination norms. He asserted, with good cause, that the majority had gone far 
beyond the bounds of normal legal reasoning to find a way not to address the attack on 
Smith, which the Court in its certiorari grant had agreed to entertain. Justice Alito, joined 
by Justices Gorsuch and Thomas, accepted the invitation with gusto, and concluded that 
Smith should be overruled.  
 
 So, unlike in Hosanna-Tabor, where all nine justices accepted the essential 
premises of ecclesiastical abstention and its lesser included element of the ministerial 
exception, Fulton revealed extreme tension among groups of justices about the basic 
premises that underlie the free exercise guaranty. Moreover, this unanimity of result, 
coupled with the obvious tension between the Alito-Gorsuch-Thomas group and all the 
	
24 Fulton, 141 S. Ct. at 1881-1882. For discussion of the superficiality of the Court’s treatment of 
this question, see Holly Hollman, Court Requires Religious Exemption But Leaves Many Questions 






others, has produced understandable speculation about the initial assignment of the 
opinion, and possible migration of the justices during the opinion writing process.25  
 
We believe that the initial line-up of the Justices contained three groups—three 
(Alito-Gorsuch-Thomas) who were eager to both overrule Smith and rule for CSS; three 
(Roberts-Kavanaugh-Barrett) who were willing to rule for CSS but reluctant or unwilling 
to overrule Smith; and three (Breyer-Kagan-Sotomayor) who were inclined to rule for the 
City under the existing case law. The questions from the justices at oral argument are 
consistent with this appraisal.26 If these divisions held, there would have been no 
majority opinion. We would have had a splintered three-three-three ruling. CSS would 
have won, and the opinion for the Roberts group would have been the narrowest 
opinion in support of the result, and therefore would have been controlling.27  
 
 All this suggests that somewhere along the way, a deal was struck to eliminate 
any dissenting opinions. In exchange, the likely dissenters got a very narrow Court 
opinion that resolved none of the deeper questions about conflicts between religious 
freedom and anti-discrimination law as it protects LGBTQ persons.  
 
Highly questionable arguments drove the Court’s decision that the City’s policies 
were not generally applicable. The opinion refers to a provision (section 3.21) in the 
City’s standard contract with agencies that provide foster care services to the effect that 
those agencies, including CSS, will not “reject . . . prospective foster parents . . . based on 
their race, ethnicity, color, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity, religion, [or] national 
origin unless an exception is granted by the Commissioner or the Commissioner’s 
designee, in his/her sole discretion.”28 This grant of discretion, the Court reasons, invites 
case-by-case exceptions, and therefore destroys the general applicability of the anti-
discrimination norm.29  
	
25 See Josh Blackman, Was There a Double Flip in the November Sitting, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY 
(June 17, 2021), https://reason.com/volokh/2021/06/17/was-there-a-double-flip-in-the-november-
sitting/ (speculating that the initial assignment of Fulton was to Alito, and the initial assignment 
of Texas v. California, cite, eventually authored by Breyer, was to Roberts). 
26 See the analysis of the oral argument in Fulton by Amy Howe of Scotus Blog here: Justices 
Sympathetic https://www.scotusblog.com/2020/11/argument-analysis-justices-sympathetic-to 
Faith-faith-based Foster-foster-care Agency -agency-in Anti-anti-discrimination Dispute, 
SCOTUSBLOG (Nov. 4, 2020) https://www.scotusblog.com/2020/11/argument-analysis-justices-
sympathetic-to-faith-based-foster-care-agency-in-anti-discrimination-dispute/ -dispute/ 
27 United States v. Marks, 430 U.S. 188 (1976) (when the Court lacks a majority opinion, the 
narrowest opinion in support of the result represents the controlling law of the case). 
28 Fulton, 141 S. Ct. at 1878; Supplemental Appendix to City Respondents’ Brief on the Merits at 
SA16, Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 141 S. Ct. 1868 (2021) (No. 19-123), available 
at https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/19/19-123/150998/20200821180751632_19-
123%20Supplemental%20Appendix%20to%20City%20Respondents%20Brief.pdf. 




Although Smith itself had suggested that, in the unemployment context, a regime 
of discretionary exceptions for “good cause” should not be viewed as generally 
applicable,30 the unemployment context is one in which such exceptions are routine and 
on-going. Once “good cause” exceptions are made, the scheme no longer applies to all 
parties in the same way. In contrast, the City Commissioner in Philadelphia 
had never made an exception under 3.21 for discrimination on forbidden grounds 
against prospective foster parents, and the City asserted that the Commissioner lacked 
authority under other provisions of the contract and under local law to make such 
exceptions.31 So, as a matter of consistent practice, the City treated the non-
discrimination norm with respect to prospective foster parents as generally applicable. 
Notably, this argument about discretion played almost no part in the presentation by 
CSS to the Court, and yet it wound up at the heart of the majority opinion.32 
 
The emphasis in the Court opinion on the contract, which Philadelphia can 
revise, reveals that unanimity in Fulton is Court-wide and an inch deep. The absence of 
any rigor in applying the standard of review confirms that assessment. Justices 
Sotomayor, Kagan, and Breyer may well have believed that the City’s interests in 
avoiding stigmatic injury to same sex couples, and material injury to LGBTQ children in 
need of placement, were sufficiently compelling to justify denial of an exemption from 
conditions of public service. Obviously, they did not say so. On any plausible accounting 
of the concerns of individual justices, unanimity in Fulton is a translucent veneer. 
 
II. The Struggle over First Principles of Free Exercise  
 
	
30 See Smith, 494 U.S. at 884. 
31 Brief for City Respondents at 31, Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 141 S. Ct. 1868 (2021) (No. 19-
123), available at https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/19/19-
123/150122/20200813151746678_19-123%20Respondents%20Brief.pdf. 
32 The other, even less plausible argument rested on the Court’s aggressive reconstruction of 
City’s Fair Practices Ordinance, which prohibits discrimination in “public accommodations 
opportunities” based on (among other grounds) an individual’s sexual orientation, constituted a 
relevant, generally applicable law. Fulton, 141 S. Ct. at 1879-1881. The Court construed the 
Ordinance as not covering foster parenting as a “public accommodation,” because the relevant 
service of certification as a foster parent involved a high degree of selectivity. Whatever the 
merits of this reading, which we doubt, the Court’s adoption of it flew in the face of carefully 
reasoned contrary findings by both the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. Both had proximity to local law, and both 
had determined that the Fair Practices Ordinance does indeed cover the opportunity to serve as a 
foster parent. See Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 320 F. Supp. 3d 661, 677 (E.D. Pa. 2018) (stating 
that “the Parties’ intent that the Fair Practices Ordinance apply to CSS’s services is manifest by 
the clear and unequivocal terms of the Services Contract”); 922 F.3d 140, 148 (applying the Fair 
Practices Ordinance to foster parents). 
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It is easy to forget that the core protections of the Free Exercise Clause remain 
solid and unchallenged. The government may not target for regulation or prohibition 
the content of worship by a particular faith. That content, historically a feature of 
regulation in England,33 involves exclusively ecclesiastical questions, about which a 
secular government has no legitimate interest.  
 
The fights over free exercise rights in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, 
however, are rarely about that core.34 Instead, the fights are about general laws and 
policies that do not target specific faiths but have an impact on religiously motivated 
practices outside of worship.35 Fulton presents a paradigm example. The City of 
Philadelphia did not direct the Archdiocese of Philadelphia to make available the 
sacrament of marriage to same-sex couples. Entitlement to that religious status is 
entirely within the province of each faith community. Rather, the City prohibited 
discrimination among lawfully married couples in the certification of potential foster 
parents. That is a public project, publicly regulated, and publicly financed. The City was 
advancing the interests of all of its people, not targeting Catholics or others for their 
view of marriage. 
 
A. The Near-Silence in Defense of Smith 
 
As Part I of this paper suggests, the fights within the Court over the past, 
present, and future of free exercise principles remain open and fierce. One puzzling 
aspect of these fights is the attitude of the current Justices toward the correctness of 
Employment Division v. Smith. When Justice Kennedy retired, the last of the five justices 
who joined in Smith left the Court. We know that at least three current justices want to 
overrule it, and at least two more are somewhat skeptical of it. Of the other four, not one 
has publicly embraced Smith.  
 
Moreover, the reticence on the Court to defend Smith is mirrored in the larger 
society of scholars, lawyers, and concerned citizens. From the beginning, Smith has taken 
intense critical fire, on a variety of grounds.36 The Court’s most liberal members at the 
	
33 See, e.g., Act of Uniformity, 14 Charles II c.4 (1662) (requiring all preachers, professors and 
teachers to take an oath affirming the theology and liturgy of the Anglican Book of Common 
Prayer, on pain of losing their position). 
34 Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993) [hereinafter Lukumi] is a 
rare exception, because it involved a bundle of regulations that targeted the worship practice of 
animal sacrifice by the Santerians. 
35 Smith itself, as well as the RFRA decision in Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do 
Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006) [hereinafter O Centro] both involved generally applicable, non-
targeted policies that had an impact on sacramental practices. 
36 See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 1; Michael W. 
McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1109 (1990). 
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time, Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun, vigorously dissented in Smith.37 Critics 
have asserted that Smith is wrong as a matter of textual interpretation and original 
understanding.38 They have offered versions of constitutional history to undermine it.39 
They assert that it cannot be squared with precedent, or with the Court’s treatment of 
other First Amendment rights.40 And they bewail the Court’s pronouncement of the 
Smith rule without warning to litigants that the Court was considering a major 
departure from prior decisions..41 
 
These criticisms originally came from the right, left, and center of the ideological 
spectrum. The coalition that organized the push for the Religious Freedom Restoration 
Act (“RFRA”)42 included representatives from all of these perspectives and included the 
voice of highly respected civil liberties organizations.43 Congress enacted RFRA in 1993 
by a nearly unanimous vote. We have noticed over many years that political actors, like 
governors, state attorneys general, and city officials are reluctant or unwilling to defend 
Smith, because so many religious people and institutions have long criticized it.  
 
In the period since about 2000, claims that religious freedom justifies refusal to 
serve same sex couples have engendered tremendous and intense opposition,44 but 
rarely has that opposition been framed as a defense of Smith. Instead, the arguments 
have taken the form of asserting that the government has a compelling interest in 
	
37 Smith, 494 U.S. at 907-921 (Blackmun, J., joined by Brennan and Marshall, JJ., dissenting). In 
Fulton, Justice Alito’s opinion canvasses the many Justices who have expressed disagreement 
with Smith. Fulton, 141 S. Ct. at 1888-1889 (Alito, J. concurring). 
38 See Fulton, 141 S. Ct. at 1900 n.34 (Alito, J. concurring). 
39 See id. 
40 See Stephanie Barclay & Mark Rienzi, Constitutional Anomalies or As-Applied Challenges? A 
Defense of Religious Exemptions, 59 B.C. L. REV. 1595 (2018). Bill Marshall was an early, contrary, 
and important voice in defending Smith on the grounds that it respected the equality of religious 
and non-religious speech. William P. Marshall, In Defense of Smith and Free Exercise Revisionism, 58 
U. CHI. L. REV. 308 (1991). Justice Alito made no effort to answer Professor Marshall’s quite 
persuasive argument. 
41 Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 1. 
42 42 USC §2000bb – 2000bb-4. 
43 See Douglas Laycock, Free Exercise and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 
883, 895-96 (1994); see also Fulton, 141 S. Ct. at 1893 (Alito, J., concurring) (noting then Rep. 
Schumer’s Introduction of the bill that became RFRA, and President Clinton’s signing of it).  
44 The leading cases include Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, 138 S. Ct. 
1719 (2017); and Arlene’s Flowers v. Washington, 443 P.3d 1203 (Wa. 2019), cert. denied, No, 19-333 
(2021). See also Brush & Nib Studio LLC v. City of Phoenix, 247 Ariz. 269 (2019); 303 Creative LLC 
v. Elenis, 2021 U.S. App. Lexis 22449, ___ F.4th ___ (10th Cir., No. 19-1413, July 26, 2021). For a 
sample of the commentary, pro and con, on the Masterpiece Cakeshop litigation and result, see the 




eradicating LGBTQ discrimination, and thus would prevail even if Smith were 
overruled.  
 
Fulton proceeded in the Supreme Court along these lines. The grant of certiorari 
in Fulton explicitly invited the Court to revisit Smith. As one would expect, the briefs for 
Catholic Social Services and many of its amici strenuously urged the Court to overrule 
Smith. Nevertheless, the City of Philadelphia and many of its amici refused to address 
the merits of Smith. They argued instead that, even if Smith was wrong, courts should 
reject claims of religious freedom to discriminate based on sex or sexual orientation. 45 
 
In the Fulton briefing, we were the voice that no one would admit they wanted to 
hear. Together with Professors William Marshall and Frederick Gedicks, we filed a brief 
on the side of the City, arguing that Smith is correct and should be reaffirmed.46 All four 
of us understand that the regime of Smith can be insensitive to religious minorities, but 
we still believe that, all things considered, Smith is better than any other proposed 
approach to religious accommodations. By our count, there were only three other 
amicus briefs that explicitly argued for retention of Smith.47 Among the forty-seven 




45 Brief of City Respondents, Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 141 S. Ct. 1868 (2021) (No. 19-123), 
available here: https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/19/19-
123/150122/20200813151746678_19-123%20Respondents%20Brief.pdf, at 47.  The City’s brief 
devoted the bulk of its argument re: Smith to the proposition that considerations of stare decisis 
favored retention of Smith. Id. at 48-52. The City offered not a single word in defense of Smith’s 
correctness.  
46 Brief of Professors Ira C. Lupu, Frederick Mark Gedicks, William P. Marshall, and Robert W. 
Tuttle as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 141 S. Ct. 1868 
(2021) (No. 19-123). 
47 Professor Eugene Volokh filed a brief on behalf of neither side, Brief of Professor Eugene 
Volokh as Amici Curiae in support of Neither Party, 
https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/19/19-123/144677/20200602140011707_19-
123%20Amicus%20Brief%20Professor%20Volokh.pdf (arguing that the Court should not overrule 
Smith, and applauding statutory schemes, such as RFRA, that authorize religious exemptions). 
On the side of Philadelphia, only two briefs besides ours urged a reaffirmation of Smith. One, 
from the National League of Cities and other organizations concerned with municipal 
government, stressed the detrimental impact on their operations that overruling would produce, 
https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/19/19-123/150736/20200820113756441_19-
123%20%20Amici%20FINALe-filed.pdf The other was from the Freedom from Religion 
Foundation and other atheist organizations, https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/19/19-
123/150812/20200820151727143_Brief.pdf. 




Despite that overwhelming quantitative imbalance, the majority of the Court 
resisted the urging to overrule Smith. Thirty years of political and scholarly criticism, 
extended and repeated legislative efforts to overturn the decision, and briefing heavily 
stacked in one direction in Fulton convinced only three Justices. Three Justices expressed 
considerable reticence about replacing Smith, and three others remained silent on the 
question. Something, not yet in view, explains the reluctance or unwillingness of six 
Justices to overrule Smith. 
 
B. The Deep Flaws in Justice Alito’s Critique of Smith 
 
Justice Alito’s opinion, which ranges over the entire waterfront of constitutional 
argument—text, structure of the First Amendment, nineteenth century history of 
religious freedom in the U.S., and an evaluation of the relevant precedent—is riddled 
with false narratives, internal contradictions, and errors of history. No one on the Court 
tried to answer his opinion in full, but unanswered is not the same as correct.  
 
 From the outset, Justice Alito’s aggressive effort to shape the narrative leads him 
astray. He promises a “fresh look at what the Free Exercise Clause demands.”49 In the 
slip opinion published on June 17, 2021, Justice Alito reviewed the law as it stood at the 
time of Smith (1990) and asserted that Sherbert (1963) “had been in place for nearly four 
decades when Smith was decided.”50 A page later, he re-asserted that the Sherbert test 
provided the governing rule in free exercise cases for “the next 37 years.”51 We are 
certain his skill at arithmetic is better than this, but we cannot help but notice the 
direction of his error, exaggerating the Sherbert rule’s longevity. 
 
 More broadly, his focus on the period from Sherbert to the eve of Smith as the 
place to begin a “fresh look” at the demands of the Free Exercise Clause is highly 
revealing. He might logically have begun with the text and history of the Clause. Or, he 
might have started with the Supreme Court’s first major engagement with the Clause in 
Reynolds v. United States52 (1878), which rejected the idea that the Clause privileged 
	
49 Fulton, 141 S. Ct. at 1889 (Alito, J., concurring). 
50 Fulton, slip op.  at 11-12 (Alito, J., concurring). 
51 Id. at 13.  See also id. at 1 (“in . . . Smith, [citation omitted], the Court abruptly pushed aside 
nearly 40 years of precedent . . .”).  In the version of Fulton now posted at LEXIS, these three 
errors about the time gap between Sherbert and Smith have been corrected. 141 S. Ct. at 1883, 
1889-90.  As of August 13, 2021, the errors remained in the slip opinion published at 
supremecourt.gov. 
52 Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878). Although Justice Alito repudiates the Free 
Exercise approach taken in Reynolds, Fulton, 141 S. Ct. at 1913 (Alito, J., concurring), he coyly 
asserts that his “discussion does not suggest that Reynolds should be overruled.” Id. at 1913 n.75. 
Why not? What compelling interest is served by denying an exemption from anti-bigamy laws to 




religiously motivated action (in that case, plural marriage). Instead, he emphasizes the 
period between 1963 and 1990 as a way to paint a narrative in which Sherbert-Yoder is 
normative, and Smith is an aberration.  
 
 His account, however, is quite backwards. Our amicus brief in Fulton more 
accurately described the flow of Free Exercise jurisprudence from 1878 onward.53 The 
Court had consistently rejected claims of free exercise exemptions until the early 1960’s.54 
Only in the period from the early 1960’s to 1990 did the Court purport to apply the 
compelling interest test to any claims of religious exemption. Moreover, as we explain 
later in this section, even in that period the Court frequently worked around that test.  
 
The most accurate description of free exercise exemption claims through history 
is that the Court denied all of them between 1878 and 1963; appeared occasionally 
sympathetic to them from 1963 through 1990; and then again repudiated them under the 
Smith rule from 1990 onward. By our count, that would be a total of 116 years in which 
free exercise exemptions were not constitutionally mandatory, and 27 years in which, 
quite sporadically, such claims succeeded. If we start counting from the ratification of 
the First Amendment in 1791, the count would be 203 years without any notion of free 
exercise exemptions, and 27 years of a doctrine ostensibly favorable to exemptions. The 
period of Sherbert-Yoder was the aberration. Smith returned the law of the Free Exercise 
Clause to normalcy. 
 
 Justice Alito’s other errors are more subtle, but hardly less conspicuous to the 
careful reader. Time after time, his own footnotes contradict his assertions. 
 
	
excellent reminder of the endless possibility of manipulation of strict scrutiny in Free Exercise 
exemption cases. 
53 Brief for Professors Lupu et al., supra, note 44 at 7-16. For a related but not identical treatment of 
the arc of Free Exercise law, see James M. Oleske, Free Exercise (Dis)honesty, 2019 WISC. L. REV. 
689. 
54 This rejection included Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940), which denied a 
claim by Jehovah’s Witness children that the Free Exercise Clause entitled them to an exemption 
from the duty to salute the American flag in school. When West Virginia Board of Education v. 
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) overruled Gobitis, it did so on the ground that the speech clause 
protected all school children from compulsion to salute the flag, regardless of their reason for 
objection. See Barnette, 319 U.S. at 634-635 & n.15. We put the Flag salute story in a wider 
perspective in IRA C. LUPU & ROBERT W. TUTTLE, SECULAR GOVERNMENT, RELIGIOUS PEOPLE (2014) 
at 183-187. In Alito’s telling of the Flag Salute story, he distorts the narrative to make it seem as if 




Start with his explanation of the text. Justice Alito claims that he will analyze the 
“normal and ordinary” meaning of the Free Exercise Clause.55 One of his first moves in 
searching for that meaning is to claim that the word “religion” requires no discussion for 
purposes of this case.56 At that point, he drops a quite extraordinary footnote, which 
reads: “Whatever the outer boundaries of the term ‘religion’ as used in the First 
Amendment, there can be no doubt that CSS’s contested policy represents an exercise of 
‘religion.’”57  
 
The question in Fulton, however, is not whether the Catholic view of who 
qualifies for its sacrament of marriage is a matter of religion.  No one disputes that.  
Rather, the question is whether the CSS policy of who may serve as a foster parent 
represents an “exercise of religion” in the constitutional sense. This policy is not a 
reflection of the internal judgment of the Church about its sacraments, a judgment that 
would exclude couples of other faiths.  The policy is aimed at the general population of 
Philadelphia, Catholic or not.  Whether such a policy qualifies constitutionally as an 
exercise of religion is a matter open to serious historical doubt, as Justice Alito’s own 
sources strongly indicate. 
 
Justice Alito’s turn to eighteenth century dictionaries further illustrates the 
embarrassing gap between the text of the Free Exercise Clause and the citations he uses 
to support his interpretation of that text. He notes, with multiple sources, that the term 
“exercise” had both a broad primary definition (“[p]ractice” or “outward performance”) 
and a narrower secondary one (an “[a]ct of divine worship whether publick or 
private”).58 Which of these should control the interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause? 
The first appears to be its non-specific use as “practice or performance,” as in musical or 
physical exercise. The second definition, however, appears in explicit connection with 
religion and has a singular meaning: “Act of divine worship.”59 As we explain further 
below, this religion-centered definition coincides perfectly with what late eighteenth 
century Americans understood as the exercise of religion. 
 
How does Justice Alito escape the conclusion that a worship-centered definition 
of religious exercise should control the meaning of the Constitution? He turns, briefly 
	
55 Fulton, 141 S. Ct. at 1895. Alito has a lengthy footnote explaining broad judicial departures from 
the “normal and ordinary” meaning of the term “Congress”within the First Amendment.  Id. at 
1895 n.27 (Fourteenth Amendment makes the First Amendment applicable to all functions of 
state government, and the First Amendment applies to federal administration of the law as well 
as law-making by Congress). Apparently, “normal and ordinary” can become quite extraordinary 
and abnormal in judicial hands. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. at 1895 n.29. 




and parenthetically, to precedent from the middle of the twentieth century—in 
particular, Cantwell v. Connecticut.60 This is just sleight of hand. First, the Cantwell 
opinion, penned in 1940, makes absolutely no reference to the original meaning of the 
First Amendment. It thus carries no weight as an originalist interpretation. Second, the 
context of Cantwell is street preaching by members of the Jehovah’s Witnesses. This is 
dissemination of the word of God, and may fall within the original meaning of the Free 
Exercise Clause. Even if that conclusion is correct, however, it does not come close to 
proving that all religiously motivated conduct should qualify as religious exercise within 
the “normal and ordinary” meaning of the Free Exercise Clause. Justice Alito is cheating 
in his textualist story, and even the cheating does not get him where he wants to go.61 
 
The best reading of Justice Alito’s footnotes belies his assertion that CSS’s 
practice involves the exercise of religion. On narrow, dictionary-driven textualist 
grounds, the phrase “Free Exercise of Religion” should be limited to acts of worship, 
and (as we explain below) the closely related practices of public preaching and 
proselytizing.  
 
Justice Alito’s analysis of constitutional history reveals the same tendentious 
qualities as his analysis of text. The relevant history fully supports the notion that 
“exercise of religion” referred to acts of worship, and certainly did not encompass all 
religiously motivated conduct. Once again, the footnotes sharply contradict Justice 
Alito’s assertions in the text. 
 
Justice Alito traces “free exercise” back to an act by the Maryland Assembly in 
1649 and says that by 1789 “every State except Connecticut had a constitutional 
provision protecting religious liberty.”62 On the sound assumption that the federal Free 
Exercise Clause reflects the widespread pattern of such protections,63 Justice Alito’s 
originalist argument rests on his reading of those state constitutional provisions. 
 
	
60 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940). In his Fulton opinion, Alito writes “The Court long 
ago declined to give the First Amendment’s reference to “exercise” this narrow reading. See, e.g., 
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 303–304 (1940).” Fulton, 141 S. Ct. at 1895 (Alito, J., 
concurring). This is the entirety of his explanation of why the original meaning of “free exercise 
of religion” extends beyond acts of Divine worship. 
61 Cantwell rests on freedom of speech, 310 U.S. at 307-311, as well as free exercise of religion, so it 
becomes less important to decide if street preaching is such an exercise.  Jesse Cantwell would 
have been equally protected by the First Amendment if he had been engaged in political or social 
advocacy, unrelated to religion. 
62 Fulton, 141 S. Ct. at 1900 (Alito, J., concurring), citing Michael McConnell, The Origins and 
Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1410, 1445 (1990). 
63 Donald S. Lutz, The State Constitutional Pedigree of the U.S. Bill of Rights, 22 PUBLIUS 19, no. 2, 
(1992), at 19-20, 27-29. 
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Here, however, his argument goes off the rails. Instead of analyzing the content 
of religious liberty encompassed by those constitutional provisions, Justice Alito focuses 
solely on a limitation frequently imposed on that liberty. Many state constitutions 
expressly provided that the right of religious liberty does not protect conduct that would 
endanger “the public peace” or “safety.”64 “If, as Smith held,” Justice Alito writes, “the 
free-exercise right does not require any religious exemptions from generally applicable 
laws, it is not easy to imagine situations in which a public-peace-or-safety carve out 
would be necessary.”65 
 
Once again, Justice Alito goes out of his way to avoid the core question. Instead 
of stressing the importance of carve-outs, Justice Alito should first and foremost have 
attended to the substance of religious liberty itself. Even a cursory reading of Justice 
Alito’s long footnote, cataloguing state constitutional guaranties in the founding period, 
shows that these provisions focused exclusively on freedom of worship and belief.66  
 
To take just one example, the 1780 Massachusetts Constitution read: “It is the 
right as well as the duty of all men in society, publicly, and at stated seasons, to worship 
the SUPREME BEING, the Great Creator and Preserver of the Universe. And no subject 
shall be hurt, molested, or restrained, in his person, liberty, or estate, for worshipping 
GOD in the manner and season most agreeable to the dictates of his own conscience; or 
for his religious profession or sentiments; provided he doth not disturb the publick 
peace, or obstruct others in their religious worship.”  
 
The concern for public order in the 1780 Massachusetts Constitution derives from 
the threat of unruly forms of worship,67 not from the broader category of all religiously 
	
64 Justice Alito lists many such provisions in his Fulton concurrence.  See Fulton, 141 S. Ct. at 1902 
n.43 (Alito, J., concurring). 
65 Id. at 1903. 
66 Id. at 1902 n. 43. See The Northwest Ordinance of 1787, Journals of Congress 334 (July 13, 1787) 
(available at https://memory.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/ampage?collId=lljc&fileName=032/lljc032.db&recNum=343). The Northwest Ordinance 
enumerated fundamental rights that each territory must respect.  Article One of these 
fundamental rights protects religious liberty. “No person demeaning himself in a peaceable and 
orderly manner shall ever be molested on account of his mode of worship or religious sentiments 
in the said territory.” Id. at 340. See also JAMES H. HUTSON, CHURCH AND STATE IN AMERICA: THE 
FIRST TWO CENTURIES 137 (2007) (“On one subject there was unanimity: Governments must not 
interfere in the spiritual realm, in men’s beliefs and modes of worship.”)  
67 The central challenge for church-state policies during this period arose from a half-century of 
exploding diversity within Protestantism.  Evangelicalism—reflected in the “First Great 
Awakening”—challenged traditional forms of religiosity from New England’s Congregationalists 
to Virginia’s Anglicans. Evangelicalism focused on a religion of the heart, rather than one 
directed primarily at adherence to creeds or ritual practices.  This shift splintered congregations 




motivated conduct. The Massachusetts provision echoes other state constitutions. All 
locate the right in worship, and many extend it to religious “profession or sentiments.”68 
 
The history of mid-eighteenth century religious conflict in the colonies provides 
the context necessary to fully understand the references to peace and order. The First 
Great Awakening brought widespread religious revivals throughout the colonies.69 
Many of the revivalists were itinerant preachers who faced hostility from some “settled” 
clergy (those who had congregations) over doctrinal and practical differences.70 These 
itinerant preachers, foremost among them George Whitefield, preached theatrical 
sermons, calling for believers to experience a “new birth” of Christ in their hearts. 
According to these preachers, this new birth is necessary to avoid the very real peril of 
hell, which they described in vivid detail.71 The sermons led some listeners to collapse, 
others to speak in tongues, and still others to cry out in fear for their souls. This type of 
worship stood in sharp contrast to the learned sermons and staid services of 
Congregationalist clergy in New England, or Anglican priests in the southern colonies.72 
 
Many ministers and others objected to the “wild” form of religiosity, which they 
found to be more spectacle than divine worship. Others feared that they would lose their 
congregants to the itinerant preachers. And still others resented the question from 
congregants or itinerant preachers about whether the settled ministers had received the 
“new birth.”73 
 
In the years before the Revolution, some colonial legislatures attempted to 
protect the interests of settled ministers by restricting the activities of itinerant ministers. 
Virginia made the most intense effort by requiring all preachers to obtain a license from 
	
communities (Methodists and Baptists in particular).  Although some clergy welcomed the 
religious vitality of this piety, many others expressed deep concern that its disdain for the settled 
religious order threatened the peace of the civil community.  See generally, FRANCES FITZGERALD, 
THE EVANGELICALS: THE STRUGGLE TO SHAPE AMERICA 13-24 (2017); JAMES H. HUTSON, CHURCH 
AND STATE IN AMERICA: THE FIRST TWO CENTURIES 73-92 (2008); THOMAS S. KIDD, THE GREAT 
AWAKENING: THE ROOTS OF EVANGELICAL CHRISTIANITY IN COLONIAL AMERICA (2007); PATRICIA U. 
BONOMI, UNDER THE COPE OF HEAVEN: RELIGION, SOCIETY AND POLITICS IN COLONIAL AMERICA 
123-167 (rev. ed. 2003); MARK NOLL, THE RISE OF EVANGELICALISM: THE AGE OF EDWARDS, 
WHITEFIELD AND THE WESLEYS (2003). 
68 See Fulton, 141 S. Ct. at 1902 n.43. 
69 See supra note 65. 
70 HUTSON, supra note 65; KIDD, supra note 65, passim; BONOMI, supra note 65, at 129-160; NOLL, 
supra note 65, at 128-132, 149-150. 
71 KIDD, supra note 65, at chs. 4-5; BONOMU, supra note 65, at 157-159. 
72 FITZGERALD, supra note 65, at 21; HUTSON, supra note 65, at 77-79; BUNOMI, supra note 6, at 142, 
150. 
73 KIDD, supra note 65, at ch. 5; NOLL, supra note 65, at 129-130 (on Gilbert Tennent’s 1740 “The 
Danger of an Unconverted Ministry”).  
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a board of Anglican clergy.74 James Madison wrote that he was greatly affected by the 
sight of Baptist evangelists jailed for violating the act.75 
 
Conflicts over these evangelical revivals fully explain the carve-outs that Justice 
Alito finds so important. Even if a state constitutional provision protected the right of 
itinerant preachers to offer a public worship service—often held outside, because towns 
or settled clergy regularly denied them the use of a church—the concern remained that 
worshippers might disturb public peace and order.76 
 
By focusing only on the carve-out, Justice Alito ignores the interpretive question 
at the heart of any serious textualist or originalist inquiry: what did the “free exercise of 
religion” mean at the Founding? Justice Alito simply assumes the conclusion he wants to 
reach and ignores obvious contradictory evidence. That evidence shows that the 
constitutional understanding of religious exercise, at the Founding, is far removed from 
the stance of CSS toward married same sex couples as foster parents, no matter how 
religiously motivated the CSS policy may have been. Justice Alito’s stipulation that 
CSS’s policies are religious exercise, within the original meaning of the Free Exercise 
Clause, is wrong.77 
 
 This is not the place to fully develop an alternative account of the textual and 
historical meaning of the “free exercise of religion.” We can, however, sketch one that is 
much more plausible than that offered by Justice Alito. This narrative starts with the 
1689 Act of Toleration,78 which granted most dissenting Protestant communities the 
right to worship and hold beliefs that differed significantly from the practices and 
doctrines of the Church of England. The Act required dissenting Protestants to take an 
oath of allegiance to the Crown and confirm their belief in certain doctrines of the faith, 
most prominently the Holy Trinity and the divine inspiration of the Bible. But it allowed 
them to worship in their own congregations and according to their own beliefs about 
baptism, communion, and church order—doctrines that had been at the heart of most 
	
74 HUTSON, supra note 65, at 82-89; BUNOMI, supra note 65, at 181-184. 
75 HUTSON, supra note 65, at 90. 
76 KIDD, supra note 65, chs. 5-7; BUNOMI, supra note 65, at 147-149 
77 Legislatures remained free, at the time of the Founding and still today, to accommodate 
religious concerns that lay beyond the constitutional guaranty of free exercise of religion. The 
most famous and obvious example is that of the Quakers, who refused to swear oaths, and 
refused to bear arms in defense of themselves or their communities. Laws that excused Quakers 
from oath requirements, conscription, or militia duty recognized their concerns of religious 
conscience, but the constitutions (state and federal) did not require that. Justice Alito recites the 
story of legislative accommodations of Quakers and other sects at p, but he insists that these 
measures are evidence that the constitution required such exemptions. Justice Scalia correctly 
saw them as permissive, and not constitutionally mandatory. City of Boerne v. Archbishop 
Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 541 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
78 The Toleration Act, 1 Will. & Mary c 18 (1689). See HUTSON, supra note 65, at 48-56 
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disputes between the dissenters and the Church of England.79 The Act also denied 
protection to any worship that threatened public peace or order—a clause that many 
state constitutions retained after Independence. 
 
 During the eighteenth century, dissenting Protestant communities in the 
American colonies frequently invoked the rights granted by the Act of Toleration. 
Although many colonial governments complied with the provisions, or even offered 
much broader liberties for worship,80 others resisted.81 At first, Massachusetts even 
refused to permit Anglican missionaries and churches, but the Crown soon ended that 
recalcitrance.82 Virginia proved the most obstinate opponent of the Act. As late as the 
Revolutionary Era, Virginia’s government denied that the Act applied to the colony. 
Licensing authorities almost uniformly refused to permit dissenting ministers to preach 
or form congregations in Virginia.83 
 
 The liberty sought by these dissenting Protestant faiths, then, focused on the 
rights of worship and public preaching.84 As their rhetoric shifted from toleration to 
religious freedom, the groups sought equality with whatever denomination enjoyed 
favored status in the colony. Laws that required licensing of dissenting clergy or 
registration of religious meeting houses failed the test of equality.85 
 
	
79 Notably, however, the Act required ministers of dissenting congregations to obtain licenses 
from the local magistrate, register their place of worship with the local Anglican bishop, and keep 
the doors to their place of worship open during any meetings of the congregation. The Act 
granted no right of religious liberty to Roman Catholics or Unitarians. And it required all subjects 
to attend some place of worship on the Sabbath. Id.; see ELLIS M. WEST, THE FREE EXERCISE OF 
RELIGION: ITS ORIGINAL CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING 44 (2019). 
80 Rhode Island (Roger Williams) and Pennsylvania (William Penn) were founded by strident 
advocates of religious liberty and incorporated general provisions for freedom of worship and 
belief into their founding documents. NICOLAS P. MILLER, THE RELIGIOUS ROOTS OF THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT: DISSENTING PROTESTANTS AND THE SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 60-63 (2012). 
81 WEST, supra note 77, at 46; MILLER, supra note 78, at 101; HUTSON, supra note 65, at 79-81; 
BUNOMI, supra note 65, at 66, 164-166. 
82 In 1691, The Crown granted a new Royal Charter for Massachusetts, which incorporated the 
Act of Toleration. BUNOMI, supra note 65, at 61. The colony, however, maintained a restrictive 
practice of funding for recognized religious congregations. HUTSON, supra note 65, at 81-82. 
83 HUTSON, supra note 65, at 82-90; BUNOMI, supra note 65, at 181-185. 
84 HUTSON, supra note 65, at 90 (“Large numbers of Virginians … were comfortable with the 
definition of liberty of conscience that had been popularized by eighteenth-century British 
dissenters: freedom from forcible interference with public worship coupled with acquiescence in 
state intervention in other aspects of religion.”) (The quote focuses specifically on Presbyterians, 
however, who received significantly better treatment in Virginia than Baptists. See id. at 87.) 
85 Id. at 91-92. See also WEST, supra note 77, at 85-86. 
	
	 21	
 The debate over public funding for ministers or houses of worship is the closest 
potential analogy for modern arguments for religious exemptions. Opponents of such 
funding, particularly Baptists, argued that the imposition of religious taxation treated 
them unequally (because they refused to provide or receive any compelled support) and 
impermissibly involved the state in matters outside the scope of its temporal authority.86 
The dissenting arguments blocked efforts to impose religious taxes in some states (most 
notably Virginia87) but failed in others (primarily Connecticut and Massachusetts88).  
 
Theophilus Parsons, a drafter of the Massachusetts Constitution, later justified 
the taxation of dissenters by distinguishing between the spiritual and civil functions of 
religion.89 All are free to believe, worship, or publicly preach according to their faith. But 
state support for certain Protestant faiths is proper because instruction in core Protestant 
doctrines—especially belief in a future state of rewards and punishments—will produce 
citizens who are more likely to obey laws and public morality. Such funding serves the 
purely civil function of ensuring peace and order, and benefits even those who do not 
seek or qualify for state funding of their ministries.90 
 
 The eighteenth century history thus suggests (in accord with Justice Alito’s 
citations) that “exercise of religion” focused on belief, worship, and public preaching. It 
does not support his conclusion that the “exercise of religion” encompasses any act that 
claimants believe is required by their faith. The Massachusetts example proves most 
telling: the law protects the “spiritual” domain, not a pluralistic idea of religiously 
motivated conduct in the civil or secular domain.91	
 
 We recognize that this Protestant-centered view of the “exercise of religion” fails 
to respect the beliefs and practices of many religious adherents in our pluralist nation.92 
	
86 MILLER, supra note 78, at 106-108. 
87 WEST, supra note 77, at 62-67; MILLER, supra note 78, at 144-147; HUTSON, supra note 65, at 117, 
121-125. 
88 See MASS. CONST. of 1780, art. II & III. 
89 Barnes v. Inhabitants of the First Church of Falmouth, 6 Mass. 401 (1810). 
90 Id. at 408-410. 
91 Our account of the 18th Century history and meaning of the Free Exercise Clause is buttressed 
by Professor Rakove’s excellent recent study of the subject.  Jack N. Rakove, Beyond Belief, 
Beyond Conscience: The Radical Significance of the Free Exercise of Religion (Oxford U. Press 
2020). See especially chaps. 2-3. 
92 This failure simply demonstrates the inadequacy of originalist interpretation – and the 
inevitable temptation to shape that interpretation to support a desired outcome. Peter J. Smith, 
Originalism and Level of Generality, 51 GA. L. REV. 1, 10 (noting that in practice the application of 
originalism "appears ad hoc, largely unconstrained, and thus susceptible to the same kind of 
results-oriented decision-making that originalists have long decried"). The same should be said of 
the Court’s emphasis on “history and tradition” as the basis for denying that government 




We do not argue that this interpretation is the best normative reading of the Free 
Exercise Clause today.93 Instead, the argument we are making is that the Constitution 
drafters of the eighteenth century understood the restriction on laws “prohibiting the 
free exercise [of religion]” as a barrier to government interference with worship, and 
perhaps with preaching the Word through religious instruction and proselytizing. The 
drafters’ meaning takes on immeasurably greater importance as the society became 
more religiously pluralistic. Reaching beyond the original constitutional limits to protect 
all religiously motivated conduct in a pluralistic society is unmanageable. As Justice 
Scalia in Smith explained: “because we value and protect that religious divergence, we 
cannot afford the luxury of deeming presumptively invalid, as applied to the religious 
objector, every regulation of conduct that does not protect an interest of the highest 
order.”94  
Justice Alito makes yet one more, all-too-common mistake in his analysis. He 
complains that Smith made the Free Exercise Clause into “essentially an anti-
discrimination provision.”95 Although it is correct to say that both the Establishment 
Clause96 and the Free Exercise Clause97 have anti-discrimination components, Smith goes 
beyond this and recognizes the Clause as protecting the right to choose forms of 
worship. As Justice Scalia wrote, “It would doubtless be unconstitutional, for example, 
to ban the casting of ‘statues that are to be used for worship purposes,’ or to prohibit 
bowing down before a golden calf.”98 The focus of these examples is not sectarian 
discrimination. Rather, they refer to direct regulation of worship qua worship, protected 
as such by the Free Exercise Clause. 
C. The Consequences of Justice Alito’s Flawed Interpretation 
 
	
Establishment Clause. See, e.g., American Legion v. American Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067 
(2019) (upholding display of Latin Cross as a secular memorial to those who died serving the U.S. 
in World War I); Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565 (2014) (upholding a pattern of 
predominantly Christian prayer to open Town Council meetings). 
93 See generally WEST, supra note 77 (arguing that the best originalist interpretation of the Free 
Exercise Clause limits the scope of its protection to a domain of “religious worship and practice” 
that is distinct from civil authority’s power over laws “protecting and promoting the earthly 
wellbeing of persons.” Id. at 197). 
94 Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 888 (1990). This statement is followed by a long list of 
the categories of law that would be vulnerable to exemption claims under Alito’s approach. Id. at 
889. 
95 Fulton, 141 S. Ct. at 1897 (Alito, J., concurring).  Justice Barrett repeats this charge.  Fulton, 141 S. 
Ct. at 1883 (Barrett, J., concurring). 
96 Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994); Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 
228 (1982). 
97 Lukumi, 508 U.S. 520 (1993). 
98 Smith, 494 U.S. at 877-878. 
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 Justice Alito’s overbroad reading of the Free Exercise Clause leads inexorably to 
a series of constitutional troubles, one piled on top of the other. First, it sweeps in a vast 
range of human behavior that is subject to law, including employment arrangements, 
family relations, and the duties of those who contract with the public. This range is 
expanded yet further by the recent tendency to advance claims of religious complicity, 
as a means of resisting duties to others who exercise privacy rights, reproductive rights, 
and marital rights in ways that some religious people oppose.99 Complicity claims arise 
in relationships, and contemporary life is thick with relationships that invite one party to 
object to the behavior of others. Masterpiece Cakeshop,100 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby,101 and 
Fulton all arose out of such claims of complicity.102  
 
 Second, Justice Alito here and elsewhere subscribes to an extremely generous 
and subjective notion of what constitutes a substantial burden on religious exercise. If 
religious exercise is confined to worship and preaching, courts can measure objectively 
the extent to which a government policy interferes with that exercise or imposes 
substantial costs on it.103 In contrast, the notion of burden as an internal, subjective 
imposition on conscience cannot be second-guessed or measured. Thomas v. Review 
Board104 pushed the idea of burden in this subjective direction, and Justice Alito’s opinion 
in Hobby Lobby amplified it.105 Other than an attack (rarely attempted by the government) 
on the sincerity of belief, the government has almost no way to successfully argue that 
an asserted burden on religious belief and practice is insubstantial.106 
	
99 See generally Douglas NeJaime & Reva B. Siegel, Conscience Wars: Complicity-Based Conscience 
Claims in Religion and Politics, 124 YALE L.J. 2516, 2518-19 (2015) (analyzing the political and legal 
contexts in which people seek exemptions from laws that make “objectors complicit in the 
assertedly sinful conduct of others”). 
100 Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2017). 
101 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. 682 (2014). 
102 Robin West describes these claims as ways that dissenters from egalitarian and feminist norms 
seek to exit the social contract concerning equal opportunities for all. Robin West, Freedom of the 
Church and Our Endangered Civil Rights: Exiting the Social Contract, in THE RISE OF CORPORATE 
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, (Zoe Robinson, Chad Flanders and Micah Schwartzman eds. 2015). 
103 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), involved just such a question. Justice Brennan describes 
the loss of unemployment compensation as a result of being unavailable for work on Saturday 
(Adele Sherbert’s Sabbath day) as the conceptual equivalent of a fine imposed upon her for 
Saturday worship. Id. at 404. 
104 Thomas v. Review Bd., Ind. Empl. Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981). 
105 Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 723-726 (accepting the assertion by the owners of Hobby Lobby that 
the contraceptive mandate substantially burdens their religious belief). 
106 This problem is well-analyzed in Frederick Mark Gedicks, Substantial Burdens: How Courts May 
(and Why They Must) Judge Burdens on Religion Under RFRA, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 94 (2017); see 
also IRA C. LUPU & ROBERT W. TUTTLE, SECULAR GOVERNMENT, RELIGIOUS PEOPLE (2014) at 241-244 
(discussing how the ruling in Thomas effectively makes each religious exemption claimant a judge 




 Third, and directly related to the second, Justice Alito’s opinion asserts that the 
standard of review for exemption claims that “comes most readily to mind is the 
standard that Smith replaced: A law that imposes a substantial burden on religious 
exercise can be sustained only if it is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling 
government interest. “107 This pair of requirements—compelling interests, and the 
requirement of narrow tailoring—are independently difficult to satisfy. Interests of the 
government may be vital, yet may fail the compelling interest test by falling just short,108 
or by being undercut by exceptions, however narrow, that weaken the government’s 
claim about the weight of the interest.109  
 
Requirements of narrow tailoring likewise are difficult to satisfy because the 
government frequently has alternatives, albeit less efficient or more expensive, to 
accomplish its ends. At times, the broader alternative may be far more effective at 
achieving the government’s goals. For example, a complete ban on importation of a 
prohibited substance, used in religious sacraments, is likely to work far better than 
monitoring by government agents of the actual deployment of the substance by the 
religious group.110 
 
 The combination of these three points—the breadth of what counts as an exercise 
of religion; the ease of satisfying the “substantial burden” test; and the difficulty of 
	
107 Fulton, 141 S. Ct. at 1924 (Alito, J. concurring). He leaves open the possibility that “this test 
[might be] rephrased or supplemented with specific rules.” Id. This is a neat invitation to weasel 
out of the test when it produces results with which a Justice is unhappy, as so often happened 
under the Sherbert-Yoder regime. Moreover, Justice Alito ignores the fact that Smith replaced a 
bundle of standards, of which this was the among the strictest. Note as well that Alito subtly 
shifts away from a test of “least restrictive means” to one of “narrow tailoring,” even though 
RFRA (designed by Congress to reinstate pre-Smith law) uses the test of least restrictive means. 42 
U.S.C. sec 2000bb-1. The test of least restrictive means is even more difficult to satisfy than that of 
“narrow tailoring,” because the government can always find a means, albeit more expensive or 
less efficient, less restrictive of religious liberty than the one challenged. See Hobby Lobby, 573 at 
764-768 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). See also Ira C. Lupu, Hobby Lobby and the Dubious Enterprise of 
Religious Exemptions, 38 HARV. J. L. & GENDER 35, 86-90 (2015) (analyzing treatment of “least 
restrictive means” in Hobby Lobby and elsewhere). 
108 In Hobby Lobby, Alito implies that only the interest in avoiding racial discrimination, and not 
other kinds of discrimination, is compelling. Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 733. 
109 For this kind of reasoning about the connection between under-inclusion and the weight of 
government interests, see O Centro, 546 U.S. 418, at 432-433 (2006); Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 727. 
Both are RFRA decisions, but the statutory standard under RFRA tracks the free exercise 
standard for which Alito contends in Fulton. 
110 See O Centro, 546 U.S. 418 (2006) (applying RFRA to exempt the group from a broad ban on 
importation of huasca tea, because the government could take the more narrowly tailored step of 
monitoring the group’s use of the hallucinogenic substance).  
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satisfying the tests of “narrow tailoring – compelling interest”— is what makes Justice 
Alito’s approach so sweeping and unmanageable.  
 
We know from extensive experience during the regime of Sherbert-Yoder that 
courts will not stay on this path, even if they pretend to do so. In the 1980s, faced with a 
doctrine that made it nearly impossible for the government to deny an exemption, the 
Court found multiple ways to work around the promise of presumptive immunity for 
religious claims. By 1990, the Court had worked around the Sherbert-Yoder standard far 
more often than it had applied that standard with the promised rigor.111 The methods 
included weakening the doctrine in government-controlled enclaves such as prisons112 
and the military;113 refining the concept of burdens to exclude difficult cases, such as 
those brought by Native Americans with respect to sacred lands,114 and weakening the 
compelling interest test to make it easier to satisfy.115 Lower courts did likewise.116 All of 
these moves produced significant departures from rule-of-law values of consistency and 
predictability in application of the law. Why should we expect anything different now? 
 
 Fourth, Justice Alito’s broad conception of free exercise, coupled with his 
assertion of a strict judicial standard to govern such claims, reveals the deep flaws in his 
structural argument about the constitutional treatment of speech, press, and association 
compared to religion. With respect to coverage, rights of speech, press, and association 
	
111 In the Fulton briefing, lawyers calling for Smith to be overruled conveniently ignored these 
work-around cases, because the pattern disturbs their preferred (but false) narrative that Smith 
abruptly abandoned a consistent posture of strict scrutiny of free exercise exemption claims. But 
we called attention to them in our amicus brief in Fulton, supra note 44 at 12-16. Justice Barrett (a 
former Scalia clerk) was definitely attuned to them. Fulton, 141 S. Ct. at 1883 (Barrett, J., 
concurring). For additional discussion, see Ira C. Lupu, Hobby Lobby and the Dubious Enterprise of 
Religious Exemptions, 38 HARV. J. L. & GENDER 35, 51-53 (2015); Michael W. McConnell, Free 
Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1109. 1110 (1990) (describing 
Supreme Court’s free exercise law on the eve of Smith as a “Potemkin doctrine”).  
112 O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987). 
113 Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986). 
114 Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988); see also Bowen v. 
Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986); Tony & Susan Alamo Foundation v. Sec’y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290 (1985). 
115 United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982); Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983). 
In both decisions, the Court failed to inquire into the availability of means less restrictive of 
religious liberty.  
116 See James E. Ryan, Smith and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act: An Iconoclastic Assessment, 78 
VA. L. REV. 1407, 1416-1437 (1992). Indeed, with the benefit of hindsight, we can see that almost 
all of the successful free exercise exemption claims in this period involved both unemployment 
compensation and questions involving worship. Yoder and Thomas are the outliers. Both involve 
religiously motivated conduct outside of worship, and both have been the source of great 
controversy. Perhaps, intuitively, the Supreme Court was leaning toward a notion of free exercise 
as worship without ever so declaring. 
	
	 26	
all relate to human activities of communication. This is a broad subject indeed, but it is 
miniscule when compared with the entire universe of human behavior, all of which may 
be touched by religious conviction.  
 
When a news organization, for example, enters into employment relations, or 
constructs a building in which to create its product, no one asserts that the First 
Amendment imposes strict standards on the government’s regulation of such activity. 
With respect to such matters, if government regulates news organizations to the same 
extent as other, comparable entities—that is, if the regulations are speech-neutral and 
generally applicable—the First Amendment has no work to do. By contrast, those who 
want to overturn Smith in free-exercise cases assert that the incidental impacts of any 
regulation of religiously motivated actors must be justified under strict, government-
limiting standards. If free exercise meant worship activities and not the entirety of 
religiously motivated acts, the structural gap between religion and other First 
Amendment-protected activity would shrink dramatically.  
 
Furthermore, with respect to standards of review, no justice or scholar has ever 
contended that a single, highly potent review standard should govern every possible 
dispute arising from regulation of communicative activity. When government regulates 
the content of communication, it must answer to the highest constitutional concerns.117 
In contrast, when government regulates the time, place, and manner of expression, the 
relevant standards are more relaxed.118 When the regulation takes the form of control of 
expressive conduct, and the government has an interest in the conduct independent of 
the message it sends, the standards are quite lenient indeed.119 Most generally, free 
speech principles do not protect speech against “incidental burdens” from generally 
applicable, speech-neutral laws.120  
 
These latter categories—regulation of conduct generally, speech-neutrally, and 
independent of the message it sends—is a precise analogue for generally applicable 
	
117 See, e.g., United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (2010); Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988).  
118 See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989). 
119 See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). In cases evaluating content-neutral restrictions 
on conduct that involves symbolic speech, the Court has consistently ruled that government 
actions were constitutionally permissible despite incidental limitations on some expressive 
activity. In addition to O’Brien, see, e.g., Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 567 (1991); City 
of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 296 (2000). 
120 See, e.g., Cohen v. Cowles Media, 501 U.S. 663, 669-70 (1991) (“[G]enerally applicable laws do 
not offend the First Amendment simply because their enforcement against the press has 
incidental effects on its ability to collect and report the news.”) (collecting cases); Branzburg v. 
Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 682 (1972) (“It is clear that the First Amendment does not invalidate every 
incidental burdening of the press that may result from the enforcement of civil or criminal 
statutes of general applicability.”). 
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standards that apply to all behavior of a certain kind, religiously motivated or not. When 
Justice Alito and others call for strict scrutiny in such cases, they are demanding special 
treatment for religion, not treatment equal to that afforded other constitutional rights.121 
 
 Many of the concerns expressed in Justice Barrett’s brief concurring opinion can 
be instructively linked to one or more of the problems that emerge from Justice Alito’s 
overbroad conception of what the constitution means by the exercise of religion. Her 
opinion asks why the Free Exercise Clause, alone among First Amendment rights, 
should be limited to concerns about discrimination. The answer is that the Clause is not 
so limited. It protects the activities of worship and preaching the Word as strenuously as 
it protects political advocacy, but it does not protect everything done in the name of 
religion.  
 
 Justice Barrett is “skeptical about swapping Smith’s categorical 
antidiscrimination approach for an equally categorical strict scrutiny regime, 
particularly when this Court’s resolution of conflicts between generally applicable laws 
and other First Amendment rights—like speech and assembly—has been much more 
nuanced.”122 This skepticism is appropriate, but far too weak, because Justice Alito’s 
conception of the exercise of religion is so much broader than any judicial conception of 
what counts as the exercise of these other rights.123 
 
Justice Barrett goes on to raise a series of concerns, at least some of which arise 
entirely from unasked and unanswered questions about the breadth of free exercise 
rights. For instance, she asks whether “entities like Catholic Social Services—which is an 
arm of the Catholic Church— [should] be treated differently than individuals?”124 A 
	
121 The gap between protection of religious speech and all other speech under such an approach is 
constitutionally unacceptable. See William P. Marshall, What is the Matter with Equality? An 
Assessment of the Equal Treatment of Religion and Nonreligion in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 75 
IND. L.J. 193 (2000). 
122 Fulton, 141 S. Ct. at 1883 (Barrett, J., concurring).  
123 Several of her questions about review standards emerge from the same concern about whether 
courts will consistently ask the same, strict questions about regulatory impacts on religion. See 
Fulton 141 S. Ct. at 1883 (Barrett, J., concurring): “What forms of scrutiny should apply? Compare 
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U. S. 398, 403 (1963) (assessing whether government’s interest is 
‘“compelling”’), with Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 462 (1971) (assessing whether 
government’s interest is ‘substantial’)” and “Should there be a distinction between indirect and 
direct burdens on religious exercise? Cf. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U. S. 599, 606–607 (1961) 
(plurality opinion).” 
124 Justice Barrett added the citation: “Cf. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and 
School v. EEOC, 565 U. S. 171 (2012).” Fulton, 141 S. Ct. at 1883 (Barrett, J., concurring). As we 
discuss in Part I, Hosanna-Tabor does not declare a general doctrine of privilege or autonomy for 




better understanding of the constitutional meaning of the exercise of religion would lead 
to a related, but different question—whether Catholic Social Services is exercising 
religion in the constitutional sense when it provides social services to the general public. 
Of course, CSS is motivated by religion, and understands itself in religious terms, but 
that cannot transform all of its daily activities into the kind of religious exercise 
protected by the First Amendment.125 
 
Justice Barrett’s final question about review standards is especially pointed: [“I]f 
the answer is strict scrutiny, would pre-Smith cases rejecting free exercise challenges to 
garden-variety laws come out the same way?”126 This question is telling, in two respects. 
First, she is acknowledging—as Justice Alito, CSS, and its amici do not—the pervasive 
pattern of work-arounds in pre-Smith law. Second, her reference to “garden variety 
laws” shows an acknowledgment of the scope of exemptions encompassed by Justice 
Alito’s broad notion of free exercise. They would include generally applicable tax laws, 
labor laws, social welfare policy, land use control, and other areas of regulation not 
aimed at the experience of worship. 
 
Justice Alito’s opinion invited these questions, and Justices Barrett, Kavanaugh, 
and Breyer deserve praise for raising them. The opinion of Justice Barrett, who is a 
former clerk for Justice Scalia, builds on the legacy of his opinion in Smith. As a result, 
and despite the few lonely voices speaking up in defense of Smith, its principles endure. 
The lower courts remain bound by it. The Supreme Court has neither the incentive nor 
sufficient interest among the current justices to take it up again quickly.127 Without a 
workable alternative, the Smith framework for adjudication of free exercise cases will 
	
ecclesiastical questions. Perhaps Justice Barrett intends the “Cf.” signal as a very shorthand way 
to communicate that distinction.  
125 Religiously affiliated hospitals, serving the general public and heavily supported by public 
money, are in the same boat as religious charities. They should not be free to claim mandatory 
free exercise clause protection for their refusal to provide necessary services to women or to 
transgender patients. Their status may soon get tested in the Supreme Court. See Dignity Health 
v. Minton, 39 Cal. App. 5th 1155 (Cal. App. 1 Dist., 2019), petition for cert. filed (U.S. Mar. 13, 2020) 
(No. 20-1135), materials available at https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/19/19-
1135/138108/20200313135611202_Dignity%20Health%20Appendix.pdf. For a sophisticated 
discussion of related issues, see Elizabeth Sepper, Zombie Religious Institutions, 112 NW. U. L. REV. 
929 (2018). 
126 “See Smith, 494 U. S., at 888–889.” Fulton, 141 S. Ct. at 1883 (Barrett, J., concurring). At the cited 
pages from Smith, Justice Scalia listed the many free exercise work-around cases from the 1980s. 
127 Soon after Fulton, the Court denied certiorari in two cases that had raised the issue of 
overruling Smith. Ricks v. Idaho Contractors Board, No. 19-66, cert. denied, 164 Idaho 689 (2021); 
and Arlene’s Flowers, Inc. v. Washington, 441 P.3d 1203 (Wash. 2019), cert. denied, 193 Wash. 2d 




remain in place. And if religious exercise is understood in Justice Alito’s broad terms, 
there is no workable alternative. 
 
D. The Scope of “General Applicability” 
 
 The one major inroad into the regime of Smith is the apparent narrowing of what 
counts as a generally applicable law. Two major developments point in this direction: (1) 
the Court’s treatment, in its emergency docket, of orders limiting attendance at houses 
of worship during the COVID-19 pandemic; and (2) the Court’s analysis in Fulton of the 
role of administrative discretion in undermining the general applicability of the law. 
Taken to their logical ends, these developments suggest that the category of generally 
applicable laws will shrink to the vanishing point, and Smith will become irrelevant.128 
The experience of courts with the pre-Smith law, however, suggests a different fate. 
 
The COVID cases and the significance of secular exceptions. As recently as the 
summer of 2020, the Court’s most prominently expressed view about the concept of 
general applicability remained its opinion in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. 
Hialeah.129 Failures of general applicability were to be found only in invidious and hostile 
departures from even-handed treatment of all religions and their secular counterparts. 
Such departures demonstrate deliberate discrimination against religion generally, or (as 
in Lukumi) a particular religion.  
 
When the first COVID cases arising from state limitations on attendance at 
houses of worship appeared at the Court in July of 2020, a narrow majority led by Chief 
Justice Roberts adhered to the Lukumi approach. In South Bay United Pentecostal Church v. 
Newsom,130 the Court refused to issue an emergency stay of court orders imposing a limit 
on attendance, on the ground that the state had treated houses of worship the same as 
the appropriate comparators. As Chief Justice Roberts explained, the right comparators 
included “lectures, concerts, movie showings, spectator sports and theatrical 
performances, where large groups of people gather in close proximity for extended 
periods of time.”131 And, as Chief Justice Roberts continued, “the Order exempts or 
treats more leniently only dissimilar activities, such as operating grocery stores, banks, 
and laundromats, in which people neither congregate in large groups nor remain in 
close proximity for extended periods.”132 The notions of similarity and dissimilarity were 
	
128 Linda Greenhouse, What the Supreme Court Did for Religion, NEW YORK TIMES, July 1, 2021, 
available here: https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/01/opinion/supreme-court-
religion.html?action=click&module=Opinion&pgtype=Homepage. 
129 Lukumi, 508 U.S. 520 (1993). 
130 South Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, 140 S. Ct. 1613 (2020). 
131 Id. at 1613 (Roberts, C.J., concurring). 
132 Id.; see also Calvary Chapel Dayton Valley v. Sisolak, 140 S. Ct. 2603 (2020) (upholding similar 
Nevada orders with respect to gatherings at houses of worship). 
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driven, quite appropriately, by the state’s expert assessment of public health risks. 
 
By November of 2020, however, Justice Ginsburg had passed away and had been 
replaced by Justice Barrett. The 5-4 majority that had controlled the outcome in the 
summer of 2020 became a 5-4 majority in support of a far more aggressive attitude 
toward rejecting findings of general applicability. In Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn v. 
Cuomo,133 and later in Tandon v. Newsom,134 the new majority asserted that religious 
gatherings had a presumptive right to be treated as well as the state treated the most 
favored secular gatherings, such as retail establishments and factories. The state’s 
justifications for the different treatment, grounded in expert opinion on the risk of 
spreading COVID-19, vanished in this approach.  
 
This new formulation of what constituted a failure of general applicability 
threatened the Smith regime. If any secular exception, however well grounded in 
considerations of policy or legislative decisions about coverage of a law, undermines 
general applicability, religious claimants would be able to successfully seek exemptions 
from a wide variety of laws of many different kinds.135 
 
It is far too soon to know whether this “most favored nation” approach to 
general applicability will take firm hold across the entire range of religious exemption 
claims, but we see reasons to be skeptical of that likelihood. First, and true to our 
conviction that restrictions on worship are at the core of the free exercise guarantee, the 
COVID-19 cases all involve limitations on group worship, and therefore implicate the 
most acute constitutional concern.136 Second, as a matter of process, the COVID-19 cases 
	
133 Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 141 S. Ct. 63 (2020). 
134 Tandon v. Newsom, 141 S. Ct. 1294 (2021). 
135 For defense of the “most favored nation” theory, see, e.g., Douglas Laycock & Steven T. Collis, 
Generally Applicable Law and the Free Exercise of Religion, 95 NEB. L. REV. 1 (2016). For critique of this 
approach, see James Oleske, Lukumi at Twenty: Legacy of Uncertainty for Religious Liberty and 
Animal Welfare Laws, 19 ANIMAL L. REV. 295 (2013). For a constitutionally expansive and more 
mixed evaluation of the approach, see Nelson Tebbe, The Principle and Politics of Equal Value, 121 
COLUM. L. REV. ___ (forthcoming 2021); available here: 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3885108 . See also Christopher G. Lund, A 
Matter of Constitutional Luck: The General Applicability Requirement in Free Exercise Jurisprudence, 26 
HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 627 (2003).  
136 Note the Court’s treatment of the decision in Kentucky ex rel. Danville Christian Academy, Inc. v. 
Beshear, 981 F.3d 505 (2020), which involved restrictions on in-person attendance at elementary 
and secondary schools, religious and secular. The state had not imposed equally demanding 
restrictions on pre-schools or institutions of higher education, so a “most favored nation” 
argument was available in this case, but the Court did not deploy it. Danville Christian Academy 





all arose in the Court’s emergency docket, and so were not subject to full briefing and 
oral argument. This may help explain why none of the justices who joined in the Court’s 
opinion in Fulton, including Justices Kavanaugh and Barrett, even mentions the COVID 
decisions in Fulton.  
 
More substantively, note that where strict review of religious exemption claims is 
triggered by the presence of a secular exception, the government will inevitably lose. 
The very presence of any exception demonstrates that the government interest in 
denying a religious exception falls short of compelling.137 Perhaps the majority in Fulton, 
determined to avoid overruling Smith, stuck together and chose not to advance a theory 
of general applicability that would make Smith mostly irrelevant, and tilt the 
constitutional scales heavily toward every religious claimant. 
 
Fulton and the relevance of administrative discretion. If we have correctly sized up 
the silence in Fulton with respect to the “most favored nation” approach to general 
applicability, what is to be made of the Fulton Court’s reliance on administrative 
discretion as the factor that undermines general applicability in this case? As we discuss 
in Part I, the discretion on which the Court relies in Fulton had never been exercised in 
the context of permitting social welfare agencies to refuse to screen particular classes of 
prospective foster parents. Such agencies, for example, could not screen only parents 
whose faith matched the agency’s faith commitments, although such preferences are not 
uncommon.138  
 
The analogy on which the Court relies in Fulton is to the unemployment 
compensation context. In Sherbert v. Verner, the state agency was engaged in making 
decisions about whether a claimant had “good cause” to refuse available work. As the 
Court in Smith viewed that context, it lent itself to individualized governmental 
assessment of the reasons for the relevant conduct. . . . [A] distinctive feature of 
	
137 Fulton, 141 S. Ct. slip op. at 14-15. In O Centro, a RFRA case, the Supreme Court used this 
move, in which underinclusive coverage of a policy is fatal to the government’s case for 
compelling interest when the policy is challenged for not exempting religiously motivated 
conduct. See O Centro, 546 U.S. at 433. For discussion of why the Court did not rely on this 
argument in Hobby Lobby, despite its availability, see Lupu, Dubious Enterprise, 38 HARV. J. L. & 
GENDER 38, at 82-86.  
138 See Rogers v. U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Servs., No. 6:19-cv-01567 (D.S.C. May 8, 2020). In 
Rogers, the plaintiffs claimed that the federal and state defendants violated the Establishment 
Clause by contracting with a faith-based foster care agency that refused to place children in any 
homes that did not conform to the requirements of the agency’s religious beliefs and practices. 
The court denied defendants’ motions to dismiss the case and the matter remains in discovery. 
Although federal and state laws and regulations prohibit contractors from discriminating based 
on religion, the then-Secretary of HHS and Governor of South Carolina granted waivers to permit 
the contract at issue. For further discussion of Rogers, including the impact of Fulton on the 
litigation, see Robert W. Tuttle,  ___ L. Rev. ___ (forthcoming 2022). 
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unemployment compensation programs is that their eligibility criteria invite 
consideration of the particular circumstances behind an applicant’s unemployment. . . . 
[O]ur decisions in the unemployment cases stand for the proposition that where the 
State has in place a system of individual exemptions, it may not refuse to extend that 
system to cases of “religious hardship” without compelling reason.139 
 
The system in Fulton looked nothing like the system described in Sherbert. 
Philadelphia had no process in place for evaluating the reasons why private contracting 
agencies might want exceptions from non-discrimination requirements. The City had 
created no such exceptions as a matter of substance. The contractual reference to the 
“Commissioner’s discretion” appeared to be a piece of administrative boilerplate, not a 
product of a policy judgment about the possibilities of “good cause” to ignore anti-
discrimination rules that govern the screening of prospective parents. 
 
As we argued in Part I, Fulton’s treatment of this grant of discretion was a 
convenience, a way to allow the Court to rule in favor of CSS without addressing the 
question of whether Smith should be overruled. But this move, if not cabined, threatens 
to do as much harm as that overruling might do. In the world of administrative 
agencies—especially at the state and local level—the use of waivers, enforcement 
discretion, and other ways of creating exceptions to policy is commonplace.140  Indeed, if 
enforcement discretion alone undermines general applicability, the entirety of the 
criminal law will no longer qualify as generally applicable.141   
 
In addition, large bodies of law administered by judges, rather than agencies, 
similarly incorporate devices for the exercise of discretion as a way of mitigating harsh, 
unjust, or constitutionally troubling results.  Such discretion may operate to reinforce 
general legal principles of fairness, or to protect important interests, some secular and 
others religious. For example, judges may choose to construe statutes in ways that avoid 
conflicts with religion,142 and they may similarly choose to apply general doctrines of 
	
139 Smith, 494 U.S. at 884. 
140  In the context of anti-discrimination laws, we urge drafters of policy instruments to remove, 
and to explicitly renounce, the possibility of discretionary exceptions.  Leaving such discretion in 
place invites a replay of Fulton. 
141 In 303 Creative LLC v. Elenis, 2021 U.S. App. Lexis 22449, ___ F.4th ___ (10th Cir., No. 19-1413, 
July 26, 2021), Chief Judge Tymkovich argued that the discretion lodged in the Colorado Civil 
Rights Commission by its processes of enforcement and adjudication made the state’s law not 
“generally applicable.” Id. at 93-96 (Tymkovich, C.J., dissenting). The discretion to which he 
pointed was no more than the agency’s normal process of investigating and adjudicating claims, 
finding some but not others to be violations of the state’s anti-discrimination laws.	
142 See, e,g., NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490 (1979) (construing National Labor 




equity to avoid hardships produced by religious beliefs, especially in matters involving 
care and custody of children.  
 
At times, and quite appropriately, administrative and judicial discretion may be 
exercised in favor of claims of religious accommodation. Accepting an absence from 
school or work on grounds of religious obligation, for example, may be fair and 
appropriate. Constitutional norms do not preclude such recognition when they are not 
designed to advance particular faiths and when they cause no significant harm to 
others.143  
 
But treating every grant of discretion, whether or not exercised, as fatal to a claim 
of general applicability turns the possibility of permissive religious accommodation into 
a surprise mandate of accommodation. In Fulton, the Court treated the grant of 
discretion to the Commissioner as the beginning and end of the case in favor of CSS. The 
mere existence of discretion supposedly made the norm of non-discrimination not 
generally applicable, and simultaneously defeated any argument from the City that it 
had a compelling interest in denying the sought-after religious exemption. This was a 
way for the Court to put Fulton behind it, but its circularity is obvious, and should not be 




Fulton is a signal to lower court judges and litigants that the regime of Smith, in 
general terms, survived challenge and remains intact. If judges see it in that light, they 
will be loath to make Smith disappear through the device of finding most laws and 
regulations not generally applicable. To be sure, free exercise claimants will aggressively 
push these theories. Judges will occasionally find cases that seem sympathetic on the 
side of free exercise claimants, and search for ways to make use of such devices in order 
to rule in favor of religion. We expect that many of these cases will involve clashes 
between conservative religious groups or individuals, and those who assert rights of 
LGBTQ equality, a context in which both Masterpiece Cakeshop and Fulton unfortunately 
have created licenses to lean towards religious claims. 
 
But judges will also see many religious claims that they do not find sympathetic, 
as well as cases in which the risk of materially undermining important government 
interests will loom large. These cases will appear in the context of criminal law, tort law, 
child welfare law, marriage and divorce law, labor and employment law, and 
administrative regulation of almost very kind. This is the state of affairs against which 
	
143 See, e.g., Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977) (recognizing duty of 
religious accommodation in the private workplace under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, so 




Justice Scalia warned in Smith, a warning to which Justices Barrett, Kavanaugh, and 
Breyer appeared sensitive in Fulton.  
 
Lower courts, and the Supreme Court itself, repeatedly worked around this 
threat in the years between Yoder and Smith. This time around, we expect that lower 
courts will find ways to resist the move toward shrinking the category of generally 
applicable laws, because the alternative will be to allow religious claimants to be, again 
and again, a law unto themselves. We recognize the instability of the current moment in 
free exercise jurisprudence, but we remain confident that wiser heads, whether or not 
more plentiful, will continue to prevail.  
